The Fall of Assad and the Uncertain Future of Syria
The lightning advance of opposition forces into Damascus marks a stunning reversal in Syria’s long-running civil war. After more than a decade of brutal conflict that killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions, President Bashar al-Assad’s grip on power appears to have crumbled with remarkable speed. Yet the victory of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allied rebel groups raises complex questions about Syria’s future and the risks of repeating past mistakes in the region.
Many observers have been taken aback by the rapid collapse of regime control over major cities such as Aleppo, Hama, and now Damascus. Assad’s forces, backed by Russia and Iran, had seemed to have largely won the civil war through sheer brutality and foreign support. But the regime’s facade of strength has shattered in the face of a well-coordinated rebel offensive, revealing the hollow core of Assad’s military power.
Several factors help explain this dramatic turn of events. Years of war, corruption, and economic collapse severely degraded the Syrian army’s capabilities and morale. Russia, preoccupied elsewhere, has been unable or unwilling to intervene decisively. Meanwhile, Turkey’s tacit support for HTS provided rebels the strategic depth needed to launch major operations.
However, we should view the emerging victory of HTS and allied groups with clear-eyed caution rather than simplistic optimism. While HTS has worked to rebrand itself as a more moderate force focused on Syria’s national interests, serious concerns remain about its ideology, governance capabilities, and long-term intentions. We cannot ignore the group's historical links to al-Qaeda and its track record of harsh rule in areas under its control.
Recent history in the region provides sobering lessons about the challenges ahead. The overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Libya and Iraq led not to democracy and stability but to state collapse, factional warfare, and human suffering on a massive scale. Despite the uniqueness of each situation, Syria is susceptible to prolonged instability if inclusive political solutions fail to follow rebel victories.
The immediate humanitarian priorities are clear: protecting civilians, providing emergency aid, maintaining basic services, and preventing revenge killings or sectarian reprisals. But the longer-term challenge is establishing legitimate and effective governance that can bridge Syria’s deep social and political divides.
This requires difficult compromises between competing factions and careful international engagement that supports reconstruction without enabling renewed authoritarianism. We must empower Syrian civil society groups, long marginalised by both the regime and armed groups, to help shape the country's future.
The international community’s track record in such situations is far from encouraging. Geopolitical interests, rather than concern for local populations, have often driven previous interventions. The risk is that Syria becomes yet another arena for regional power competition rather than receiving the sustained, coordinated support needed for genuine stabilisation and recovery.
Turkey, which has emerged as a key player through its influence over rebel groups, faces particular challenges. While Ankara may welcome Assad’s fall, it must now help ensure that northern Syria does not become a permanent zone of militia rule and proxy conflict. This requires difficult decisions about disarming and integrating rebel forces into legitimate security structures.
Over 3.6 million Syrian refugees, whose presence has become increasingly contentious amid growing economic pressures and rising anti-Arab sentiment within Turkish society, further complicate Turkey’s strategic calculations. The rapid change in Syria’s political landscape offers Ankara a potential path to address this domestic challenge, with early reports suggesting hundreds of refugees are already making their way back across the border, drawn by hopes of reclaiming their former lives.
While these spontaneous returns might provide President Erdogan’s government with a welcome relief valve for social tensions, the broader implications of large-scale refugee repatriation remain complex. The sustainability of these returns will depend not just on security conditions but on the capacity of a post-Assad Syria to absorb and reintegrate millions of displaced citizens into communities transformed by years of conflict. This demographic dimension adds another layer of urgency to Syria’s political transition, linking Turkey’s domestic stability directly to the success or failure of whatever new order emerges in Damascus.
The regional calculus extends well beyond Turkey’s interests. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, having recently reconciled with Assad, must now recalibrate their approach to Syria. Israel watches warily, concerned about both Iran’s continued presence and the potential for Syria to become a new base for hostile actors. Hezbollah’s potentially diminishing role in Syria threatens Lebanon’s stability, which is deeply intertwined with Syria’s trajectory. Iraq, too, faces challenges as changes in Syria could affect its own delicate sectarian balance and ongoing struggles with militant groups.
The Kurdish question remains central to Syria’s future stability. The autonomous administration in northeast Syria, which developed significant governing capacity during the conflict, controls crucial resources and territory. Any lasting political settlement must address Kurdish aspirations for autonomy while managing Turkey’s security concerns. The experience of Iraqi Kurdistan might offer lessons in balancing regional autonomy with central state authority.
HTS’s governance record in Idlib provides important indicators of its potential approach to wider control. The group has attempted to establish civil administrative structures and basic services, though with mixed results. Its religious courts operate alongside civil institutions, while its economic management has focused on controlling border crossings and key resources. However, international isolation has limited its ability to deliver more comprehensive governance.
International institutions could play a crucial role in Syria’s reconstruction, but only with careful coordination. The UN’s experience in post-conflict settings suggests the need for a multi-track approach: immediate humanitarian assistance through agencies like WFP and UNHCR, alongside longer-term development support from the World Bank and UNDP. Success stories from Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrate how international oversight can help manage competing local interests while rebuilding state institutions.
The international response in the coming weeks will be crucial. Rather than simply picking winners and losers, external powers should focus on preventing further bloodshed and creating conditions for Syrians to chart their own political future. This means supporting local governance initiatives, enabling humanitarian access, and pressing all armed groups to respect human rights and international law.
For Syrians themselves, the end of Assad’s reign offers both hope and uncertainty. Many who suffered under his brutal rule celebrate his apparent downfall. But they also fear what comes next, especially given the country’s traumatic experience with violence and extremism. Building trust between communities and creating inclusive political institutions will take years of patient work.
Syria’s people have already paid an almost unimaginable price through years of war. They deserve better than to see one form of authoritarian rule simply replaced by another. While Assad’s fall may have been necessary, it is only the beginning of Syria’s long journey toward peace and renewal.
The path forward requires sustained commitment to democratic principles, transitional justice, and inclusive governance—not just from Syrians but from regional and international actors as well. Otherwise, the current moment of change could turn into another lost opportunity in the turbulent history of foreign intervention in the Middle East.
The world must learn from past failures while remaining engaged enough to help Syrians build a better future. This means supporting civil society, enabling reconciliation processes, and creating incentives for armed groups to transition into legitimate political actors. The alternative—disengagement and indifference—would likely condemn Syria to further cycles of violence and despair.
